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Changing Standards of Review
Jeffrey C. Dobbins*
Do standards of review matter? On the one hand, judges insist that
they do, and appellate practitioners know that they ignore standards of
review at their peril. On the other hand, it is not unusual to find judges
and academics who concede that there is not much difference between
the many standards of review, and that the articulation of the standard
may not make much of a difference in reversal rates.
To test the question, researchers would ideally take a set of cases, have
a court decide them under one standard of review, and then, while
avoiding any bias from deciding the same cases twice, have the same
court decide the cases under a different standard. Though this is not a
practical experiment, recent legal history offers examples in which
legislative and judicial decisions have altered the standard of review for
particular types of cases. By comparing reversal rates that precede a
change in the standard against reversal rates in the same court from
cases that post-date it, researchers can come as close as possible to the
ideal experiment: testing the same cases under two different standards.
An initial look at one instance of a changed standard of review
supports the proposition that merely altering the standard does not shift
reversal rates. This look also suggests a hypothesis about standards of
review that might reconcile the tension between those who are convinced
that standards matter and those who think they do not. In particular, this
Article suggests that standards of review are unlikely to drive changes in
reversal rates because the standards are not drivers; rather, standards
reflect an understanding about the role of various institutions within the
legal system in a particular type of case. Unless those understandings
change, reversal rates are unlikely to change even if the standard does.
For that reason, legislatures and practitioners seeking to influence
appellate court reversal rates should focus more of their attention on
changing those understandings, rather than merely changing the
language of the standard. Finally, this Article suggests an agenda for
future investigations into the standard of review by pointing out two other
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instances where the standard changed. Examining reversal rates
associated with those instances will continue this investigation into the
source and significance of standards of review in our legal system.
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INTRODUCTION
The bread and butter of appellate advocacy is the standard of review.1
From Supreme Court Justices to professional instructors of legal writing,2
from bar journals to hornbooks on the appellate process,3 those who offer
their advice to appellate counsel emphasize the importance of phrasing
one’s argument in terms of the applicable standard.
Ask most appellate judges and practitioners, and they will confirm that
this emphasis on the standard of review is not mere rhetorical flourish.
The standard of review that governs a particular issue on appeal has been
characterized as the pivot on which judicial decisions turn.4 D.C. Circuit
Judge Patricia Wald once wrote that the standard of review in a case
“more often than not determines the outcome” of that appeal,5 and Tenth
Circuit Judge Deanelle Tacha wrote that “to the [appellate] judge, [the
1. The standard of review defines how deferential an appellate court should be to the judge (or
agency) under review; as such, it effectively determines how willing an appellate court should be
to reverse the decision below. See DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES,
FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 222 (2d Ed. 2006) (“[S]tandards of review address …
whether the reviewing court should defer to the trial court and, if so, to what extent.”). For instance,
under a deferential standard of review, such as “clear error,” an appellate court would reverse only
if it was strongly convinced that the prior decision was in error, and reversal should be relatively
rare. MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, APPELLATE ADVOCACY AND MOOT
COURT 5–6 (2006). Under less deferential standards of review, such as de novo review, an
appellate court makes up its own mind, and gives no particular weight to the decision below, so
reversal should be more common than under deferential standards. Id. (“The difference between
an issue on appeal case that is governed by a de novo standard . . . as opposed to an issue governed
by a clearly erroneous standard . . . is the difference between an appeal that may have a decent
change and one that may have a snowball’s chance in hell.”). See also Paul Verkuil, An Outcomes
Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 687–88 (2002); Part I.A.1
(describing the process of appellate review and the three standards that this Article will specifically
contemplate).
2. See BRYAN A. GARNER & ANTONIN SCALIA, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF
PERSUADING JUDGES 11 (2008) (noting that the fifth “general principle of argumentation” is to
“pay careful attention to the standard of decision”).
3. See Henry Deeb Gabriel, Unequaled Expertise: Childress and Davis’ Federal Standards of
Review, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 163, 164 (“[T]he appropriate standard of review is essential
to appellate practice.”); Nathan Hecht, Revisiting Standards of Review in Civil Appeals, 24 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 1041, 1041 (1993) (noting the standard of review is “the anvil on which the recitation
of facts and the argument are both to be forged, and it as much as anything else determines their
cast. Each word should be aimed at proving that the ruling on appeal either does or does not meet
the standard by which it is to be judged”).
4. MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, ADVERSARIAL LEGAL WRITING AND
ORAL ARGUMENT 103 (2006) (“The standard of review can have a tremendous impact on the
chances of success on an appeal.”).
5. Patricia Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371,
1391 (1995).
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standard of review] is everything.”6
The importance of the standard in appellate practice, then, is difficult
to overstate. By setting the decision rule for when the appellate court is
able to reverse the findings below, the standard effectively calibrates an
“index point” for the likelihood of reversal, as determined by a level of
appellate court confidence in the validity of the ruling below. The
standard, therefore, serves to define the relationship between the
reviewing court and the entity whose decision is under review. It outlines
the scope of authority that reviewing judges have over the decision, and
it often reflects a statutory—and occasionally, a constitutional—
mandate.7 Those who offer advice to appellate attorneys invariably focus
their attention on the standard of review in appellate courts, and on the
impact that the standard has on the appellate process.
Despite the importance of the standard of review, however, the source
of the standard in a given case is often curiously underdetermined by
positive law and “imperfectly provided by precedent.”8 It is true that
rules and statutes occasionally define the relevant standard.9 In other
cases, though, no law provides the standard. In an effort to determine
what the standard of review should be, the appellate court and counsel
may engage in a complicated analysis involving conclusions about the
“factual” or “legal” nature of the question presented, as well as the
relevant roles of appellate and trial courts with respect to that question.10
6. HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW: APPELLATE
COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS, at vii (2005).
7. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined
in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”); 5 U.S.C. § 706
(2015) (defining scope of review); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (noting judicial findings of fact “must
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous”).
8. Steven Alan Childress, Constitutional Fact and Process: A First Amendment Model of
Censorial Discretion, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1229, 1232–33 (1996); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990) (noting the difficulty of first order determination between issues
of fact and law).
9. This is particularly true in the review of administrative agency decisions, given the prevalence
of statutory Administrative Procedure Acts. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (describing the scope of
review for reviewing courts); OR. REV. STAT. § 183.400 (2016) (describing the judicial review of
agency rulemaking); OR. REV. STAT. § 180.482 (2016) (reviewing agency orders for contested
cases); OR. REV. STAT. § 180.484 (2016) (reviewing agency orders for cases other than contested
cases).
10. Consider, for instance, the multi-page discussions regarding the appropriate standard of
review in Sch. Dist. of Wisconsin Dells v. Z.S., ex rel. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 674–75 (7th Cir.
2002) (discussing the appropriate standard of review in a challenge to a state Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) decision regarding violation of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), in State
v. Navas, 913 P.3d 39, 49 (Haw. 1996) (discussing the standard of review for determinations of
probable cause in an issuance of a search warrant), in Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank, N.A., 880
F.2d 928, 939 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing the standard for review for the imposition of Federal Rule
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It is rather surprising that such a critical part of the appellate process—
determining the intensity with which appellate courts review decision
making on a particular topic—remains so often undetermined.11
Furthermore, in the midst of this substantially unguided effort to define
the scope of review, there is a curious conflict at the core of appellate
standard of review definitions: advocates, judges, and academics
repeatedly suggest that the standard might not affect outcomes as much
as one might think. It is, for example, not at all unusual for appellate
judges to hint—amid discussions on the topic—that the particular
standard of review may not really matter.12 Similarly, advocates calling
for a particular standard of review might have difficulty identifying
circumstances when a different standard would really make a difference
in the outcome of their case.13 And often, appellate courts brush aside
difficult problems in defining the standard of review by noting that one
standard or another would likely not make a difference in a particular
case.14
This case-specific skepticism about whether a particular standard of
review actually affects the likelihood of reversal is not clearly resolved
by academic studies where researchers have examined the impact of the
standard of review on appellate outcomes. On the one hand, some
empirical investigations suggest that the standard of review has the
predictive value that one might expect—noting that deferential standards
lead to reversals less often than non-deferential standards.15 On the other

of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions), and in Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405 (same).
11. To this extent, the standard of review is like other areas of appellate practice—the rules of
precedent, the record review rule and exceptions to it, and the exercise of appellate courts’ inherent
and supervisory authority—that amounts to a “procedural common law” for appellate courts. See
generally Jeffrey C. Dobbins, New Evidence on Appeal, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2016 (2012) (discussing
the underlying principles in appellate record review); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent,
108 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (2010) [hereinafter Dobbins, Structure] (highlighting the difficulties in
evaluating the precedential effect when the standard structure or process of appellate review is
altered).
12. See United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]here are more verbal
formulas for the scope of appellate review . . . than there are distinctions actually capable of being
drawn in the practice of appellate review.”).
13. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105
(2008) (No. 06-923) (citing to Justice Alito: “I don’t know how thin you can slice these standards
of review”).
14. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163 (1999) (“[W]e have failed to uncover a single
instance in which a reviewing court conceded that the use of one standard rather than the other
would in fact have produced a different outcome.”).
15. See, e.g., Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of
the Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1159 (2010)
(“[S]tandards of review could increase or decrease the likelihood of reversal of district court
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hand, equally thoughtful studies have concluded that the typical spectrum
of standards of review imperfectly reflects—and, occasionally, fails to
predict—relevant rates of reversal.16 One would expect, for instance, that
reversal rates should be lower when appellate courts use a highly
deferential standard of review (like arbitrary and capricious review) than
when they use a more skeptical standard (such as de novo review). That
expectation, however, does not always pan out in practice.17 So it appears
that, at least in part, the skeptics are right: sometimes, the standard of
review makes little difference to reversal rates.
How can the apparent importance of the standard of review to the
appellate process be reconciled with evidence and anecdotes suggesting
that the precise standard of review does not matter to the degree that one
might expect?
In an effort to address this question, this Article examines the role of
the standard of review in the state and federal courts of the United States.
Part I briefly describes the current understanding of traditional standards
of review: what they are, the history of their development, and the
consensus understanding regarding their role in the American legal
system. Part I also incorporates a discussion of the standard of review in
administrative law contexts. While there are, of course, differences
between appellate court review of trial court decisions and the role of
courts in reviewing administrative agencies’ decisions, the relevant
standards are often discussed together, or in comparison with one another,
and the concerns and considerations regarding the importance of
standards of review are similar in the two contexts.
Part I then continues by examining the current understanding—both
anecdotal and empirical—about the degree to which the standard of
review matters (i.e., whether the standard does, in fact, make a difference
in the outcome of cases under review). As already noted above, the jury
is out (so to speak) on this question: the data suggests that the standard
might not make as much of a difference in case outcomes as the language
of various standards might suggest.
This seems odd, indeed. Given the importance of standards of review
in the work of appellate judges and appellate practitioners, one would
judgments . . . .”); see infra Part I.D (ascertaining whether different standards affect outcomes).
16. See Paul Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 679, 721 (2002) (“[R]ate of reversals may become constant over time or may simply reflect
the transition to a new regime by trial courts learning to adjust.”).
17. See id. at 687, 717 (finding that Freedom of Information Act reversal rates under the
arbitrary and capricious review standard did not correlate with the hypothesized difference
predicted by the author).
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hope that a different standard of review would make a predictable
difference in the rate of reversal—a critical measure of appellate review.
If a difference in the standard does not make a predictable difference in
the rate of review, then what is the point of the hue and cry regarding the
standard of review at all?18 How can one reconcile the conviction of
practitioners and judges—as well as the cost in time and energy—
regarding the fundamental importance of the standard of review, with the
empirical suggestion that differing standards have only incidental impact
on the result of cases in the judicial process?
Existing literature contributes to the conflict as much as it helps to
reconcile it. Current empirical investigations are necessarily complicated
by the multitude of decision makers and the variety of causes of action
under review in the pool of relevant decisions. While the large number
of cases reviewed allows investigators to make useful statements about
overall reversal rates,19 the investigations are necessarily hampered by
the fact that any comparison of reversal rates between different standards
of review also involves cases on appeal that differ in type.20 In such
instances, any differences in reversal rates might be explained by
different judicial attitudes toward the underlying substance of the appeal,
rather than the different approaches to the standard of review.
In an effort to avoid this problem and to extend the existing literature,
Part II of this Article takes a different approach. Rather than comparing
reversal rates under different standards of review as applied at the same
moment in time over different types of cases, this Article examines
circumstances in which the standard of review changed over time for the
same type of cases. By limiting the investigation to a particular category
of cases in which such a change occurred, this approach limits any
variation in reversal rates that might result from the difference in the type
of case, rather than the standard of review.
This approach is still imperfect, of course. It trades variation caused
by differences in case types for variation associated with changes over

18. In the absence of consensus regarding the value (or lack thereof) of careful attention to the
standard of review, judges and counsel might well still write opinions and briefs targeted to
standards of review; if the standards were only rhetorical window-dressing, though, we might
expect parties to ultimately fall out of practice.
19. This is essentially the conclusion in these studies. See, e.g., Yung, supra note 15, at 1159,
1161–65 (discussing how adjusting for standard of review in an empirical study can determine how
appellate judges’ ideology influences reversal rates).
20. For instance, Verkuil’s examination into the difference between reversal rates under an
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of review and reversal rates under a “de novo” standard required
comparing administrative appeals under the Social Security Act, on one hand, and under FOIA, on
the other. Verkuil, supra note 16, at 689, 710–14. Such fundamental differences in case type can
easily complicate the analysis about the importance of standards of review. Id.
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time. As time passes, the judges on the relevant court will change, as do
facts between cases—even if the cases are of the same type. But this
complicating factor is not absent from existing studies: there was no
guarantee that the same panels of judges were deciding cases or that the
facts were constant between cases with different standards. Under this
Article’s approach, the pool of decisions under review after a change in
the standard of review should be statistically similar in makeup to the
pool of decisions that preceded the relevant change. This similarity
should allow a relatively direct comparison between reversal rates in the
pre-change and post-change eras.
Part II focuses its attention on one instance in recent legal history in
which the standard of review changed for a particular class of cases. Prior
to 2009, the Oregon Court of Appeals was required to review facts found
in “equitable proceedings” under a de novo standard. In 2009, however,
the Oregon Legislative Assembly amended the relevant statute and gave
the Court of Appeals the discretion to use either de novo review or,
instead, a standard that simply asked whether there was “any evidence”
to support the lower court’s findings.21 In cases after the amendment,
then, the Oregon Court of Appeals reviewed “equitable proceedings”
both under an “any evidence” standard and, in cases when it so chose,
under a de novo standard. This empirical investigation demonstrates that
reversal rates did not significantly change under the new standard of
review.
This conclusion suggests that, while a change in the standard of review
makes a rhetorical difference in the appellate process, it does not drive
substantially different outcomes with respect to reversal rates. Rather, a
change seems to only reflect a preexisting understanding about the proper
role of the reviewing court in comparison to the initial court or agency.
This is not to say that standards of review are irrelevant. They matter
rhetorically, and that rhetoric may eventually change the way courts think
about the underlying relationships. This Article suggests, however, that
(contrary to the traditional understanding) the standard of review does not
have an automatic effect on reversal rates. The effect of a standard of
review comes not from the mere power of its words, but from how it
affects the way appellate courts think about their relationship with the
entity whose decision is under review.
Part II of the Article concludes by identifying other moments in recent
legal history when the standard of review changed for a particular type of
case. From 2000 to 2001, for instance, the United States Supreme Court
21. See infra Part II.A (discussing the discretionary de novo review in Oregon).
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fundamentally altered the standard of review used when reviewing
agency decisions that do not speak with the “force of law.”22 And in
1996, the Supreme Court shifted from a de novo standard of review to an
abuse of discretion standard in the review of decisions that depart from
sentences assigned under the federal sentencing guidelines. Future
investigations into the effect of these changes on reversal rates can further
test the effect of the standard of review on the appellate process and
further evaluate the validity of the conclusions developed in this Article.
Part III re-examines the tension between the perspective that
differences between standards of review do not make a difference in
reversal rates compared to the traditional view that these standards do
matter and are critical parts of the appellate process. Ultimately, this
Article suggests that this tension can be reconciled by accepting that, in
general, standards of review are insignificant to the likelihood of reversal
in a particular case, and that the precise phrasing of a standard of review
is inconsequential to the outcome of an appeal. But this Article also
suggests that the standard of review is important as a signaling tool to the
reviewing court—as well as to the parties and the decision makers
below—indicating a variety of factors that do influence how parties
approach litigation and appeals, and how they interact with and think
about the role that the courts have in resolving decisions in a given case.
This observation leads to two suggestions for entities that seek to
define standards of review and for counsel who need to use them. In both
instances, this Article suggests that the critical consideration in the
definition and application of a standard of review is not the language of
the standard itself, but the nature of the relative authority and roles of the
reviewing and initial decision-making entities that is reflected in the
language of the standard. In other words, it is not what the standard of
review is, but why it is what it is, that most likely affects the outcome of
a case. Whether defining the standard of review for the first time,
applying an established standard, or changing the standard of review
midstream, a particularly careful—and explicit—focus on the
assumptions that the standard is making about the relative authority of
the parties within the legal system is likely to have more significant
results in reversal rates than the mere linguistic exercise of defining,
applying, or changing the applicable standards of review.

22. See infra Part II.B.1 (describing when the “force of law” analysis was introduced in the
United States Supreme Court).

21_DOBBINS_DOCUMENT4 (205-251).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

214

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

1/23/17 9:44 AM

[Vol. 48

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW: FUNDAMENTALS
A. Current Understanding
This Article divides the standard of review question into two large
categories: (1) appellate court review of trial court rulings; and (2)
reviewing court examination of administrative agency decisions. While
these two categories are, on their faces, rather different, the standards of
review used in each context are often compared, and applied with
reference, to these different areas of judicial review.23 As the United
States Supreme Court has noted, the history of the recognized standards
in these two areas is one where there is a substantial amount of
crosspollination between standards for appellate review of judicial
decisions and standards for judicial review of administrative decisions.24

23. This analytical crossover between the standards of review can be seen in the early years of
both federal administrative agencies and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 1936, then-Dean
of Yale Law School, Charles Clark, explicitly connected the clear error standard of review being
proposed for judicially-determined questions of fact under proposed Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68 and the deferential standard of review of decisions issued by the Federal Radio
Commission, predecessor of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), which called for
findings of fact, “if supported by substantial evidence, [to] be conclusive unless it shall clearly
appear that the findings of the commission are arbitrary or capricious.” Charles E. Clark &
Ferdinand F. Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 210–11 (1937) (citing 47
U.S.C. § 96(d) (1927) (repealed 1934)). As Clark and Stone note, “it may be suggested that the
gap between the two rules seems not overlarge.” Id. at 211. They later explicitly called for a
standard, “perhaps stated in the very words of the amendment to the Radio Act quoted above, to all
cases alike,” including judicial facts found in civil cases. Id. at 217. In a more recent case, the
Supreme Court noted that what appeared to be a conflict between the Federal Circuit’s standard of
review for factual determinations made by the Patent and Trademark Office—one explicitly based
on the Circuit Court of Appeals’ review of judicial decisions—was effectively no dispute at all,
because the Federal Circuit’s “clear error” standard did not look substantially different from the
deferential standard under the APA. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163 (1999).
24. “The relevant linguistic conventions were less firmly established before adoption of the
APA than they are today. At that time courts sometimes used words such as ‘clearly erroneous’ to
describe less strict court/agency review standards.” Id. at 156 (citing Polish Nat’l All. of U.S. v.
N.L.R.B., 136 F.2d 175, 181 (7th Cir. 1943), aff’d, 322 U.S. 643 (1944); New York Trust Co. v.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 131 F.2d 274, 275 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 786 (1943); Hall
v. Comm’n, 128 F.2d 180, 182 (7th Cir. 1942); First Nat’l Bank of Memphis v. Comm’n, 125 F.2d
157 (6th Cir. 1942); N.L.R.B. v. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., 121 F.2d 602, 606 (7th Cir.
1941)). “Other times they used words such as ‘substantial evidence’ to describe stricter court/court
review (including appeals in patent infringement cases challenging district court factfinding).” Id.
(citing Cornell v. Chase Brass & Copper Co., 142 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1944); Dow Chem. Co.
v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 139 F.2d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 1943), aff’d, 324 U.S. 320
(1945); Gordon Form Lathe Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 133 F.2d 487, 497 (6th Cir. 1943), aff’d sub
nom. Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon Form Lathe Co., 320 U.S. 714 (1943); Electro Mfg. Co. v. Yellin,
132 F.2d 979, 981 (7th Cir. 1943); Ajax Hand Brake Co. v. Superior Hand Brake Co., 132 F.2d
606, 609 (7th Cir. 1943); Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. Beckwith Mach. Co., 105 F.2d 941,
942 (3d Cir. 1939)).
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1. Appellate Court Review of Trial Court Decisions
The standard division between appellate court standards of review
depends primarily on the relevant question under review. Traditionally,
questions of law are reviewed de novo,25 questions of fact are reviewed
for clear error, and exercises of discretion are reviewed for abuse of
discretion.
There are two concerns presented when a new “issue” arises on review
in a matter where the standard of review might not be clearly established.
First, courts will usually attempt to characterize the nature of the question
at issue: Is it a question of law, a question of fact, or an exercise of
discretion? Determining the area into which a given appellate issue falls
can often be difficult; as Steven Childress has noted, the distinction
between these three areas is “somewhat artificial, as law, fact, and
discretion may be said to occupy three sides of one strange coin. Or at
least in the application of appellate judicial decision making, they often
overlap like the circus ringmaster’s three spotlights.”26 Given the
uncertain borders between these layers, appellate courts faced with a
previously undetermined question will often find themselves
characterizing an issue as a “mixed question” of law and fact. A court
might review a hybrid issue either de novo or deferentially, or it may take
a hybrid approach itself (i.e., reviewing certain factual premises
deferentially, but then examining the application of law to those facts de
novo).
De novo review is review without deference. In theory, an appellate
court reviewing questions of law makes its own decision about the proper
outcome on that question, and does so without reference to, or any
necessary reliance on, the trial court’s rulings on the same issue.27 This
25. In Oregon, the term “de novo” is reserved for review of facts. Unlike in the federal system,
where questions of law are characterized as being reviewed “de novo,” in Oregon:
We do not . . . review questions of law “de novo.” That term derives from appellate
review of equity cases and refers solely to the court’s ability to make its own
determination of the facts when it has the authority to “try the cause anew upon the
record.” See [OR. REV. STAT. §] 19.125(3) [(2016)]. Although some federal courts
misuse the phrase to describe review of issues of law as well as of fact, in Oregon it is
clear that it applies only to issues of fact. See O.R.A.P. 5.45 n.1. We assume that
plaintiff means to say, as our rules suggest, that we review the trial court’s legal
determination for errors of law rather than for abuse of discretion, not that we find facts,
something that is beyond our authority in an action at law. See [OR. CONST. art. 7, § 3
(amended 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §] 19.125 [(2016)].
Trabosh v. Washington City, 915 P.2d 1011, 1014 n.6 (Or. 1996).
26. Childress, supra note 8, at 1231.
27. See, e.g., Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232–34 (1991) (discussing appellate
standards of review for diversity state-law actions); Appeal de novo, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
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approach is more complicated when it comes to reviewing legal findings
of administrative agencies, as is noted below.
Findings of fact made by juries are reviewed differently than findings
of fact made by courts. The United States Constitution constrains the
power of courts to review jury findings. On appellate review for such a
finding, the relevant inquiry is therefore usually phrased as one of law:
the jury’s finding can be abandoned only if, based on a review of all the
evidence, no reasonable jury could have reached the conclusion that it
did.28 With respect to judicial findings of fact, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52 limits review to reversal only when findings are “clearly
erroneous.”29
Although the meaning of the phrase “clearly erroneous” is not
immediately apparent, certain general principles governing the exercise
of the appellate court’s power to overturn findings of a district court
may be derived from our case. The foremost of these principles, as the
Fourth Circuit itself recognized, is that “finding is ‘clearly erroneous’
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” This standard plainly does not entitle a
reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because
it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently.30

Finally, discretionary decisions can be reversed only where the trial
court has abused its discretion. “There is no one formulation of the abuse
of discretion standard. Instead, a highly contextual inquiry varies
depending on the setting.”31
Poor decision-making processes,
consideration of factors that should not have been considered, or the
failure to consider facts that should have been considered are all
circumstances in which an appellate court could reverse a trial court’s
112 (9th ed. 2009) (“An appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial court’s record but reviews
the evidence and law without deference to the trial court’s rulings.”); 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS
& MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 2.14 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing de novo
review).
28. See, e.g., Hollowell v. Orleans Reg’l Hosp. LLC, 217 F.3d 379, 385 (5th Cir. 2000)
(reasoning that a jury could reasonably find successor liability for a subsequent business when some
of the factors determining successor liability were present).
29. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(A)(6) (“Findings of fact . . . must not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.”).
30. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (citation omitted). The Seventh
Circuit has suggested that reversal for clear error requires a decision to “strike us as more than just
maybe or probably wrong; it must . . . strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old,
unrefrigerated dead fish.” Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th
Cir. 1988).
31. Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Study,
2012 UTAH L. REV. 1, 8 (2012).
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decision for abuse of discretion.32 In the end, however, consideration
under this standard turns on whether the trial court has chosen within a
“range of acceptable options”—which affords the trial court substantial
discretion.33
2. Review of Administrative Decisions
While review of trial court and jury decisions dominates the work of
federal appellate courts, they are also responsible for reviewing the
validity of agency action. Sometimes appellate courts do this directly—
as is true for certain regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Act34—
and sometimes indirectly—by reviewing, on appeal, a district court’s
decision in a run-of-the-mill petition for review under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”).
For federal appellate courts,35 the responsibility associated with
reviewing administrative decisions is at least as significant a role as that
associated with the review of trial court decisions. As with review of trial
court decisions, most questions presented for review in administrative
law cases fall into three categories: (1) determinations of fact; (2)
determinations of law; and (3) decisions on discretionary or policy
matters.
Factual determinations by federal agencies are generally set aside only
if they are “arbitrary [or] capricious.”36 As the United States Supreme
Court has noted, courts traditionally have seen the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review as more deferential than the “clear error”
standard that courts use to review factual findings by other courts.37 This
32. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 27, § 4.01[3], at 4, 12–15 (discussing how courts apply the
abuse of discretion standard).
33. Id. § 4.01[1], at 3–4.
34. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(B)(1) (2015) (noting the procedures for judicial review of an
“action of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air quality
standard”).
35. And, to some degree, state courts as well. Although a complete examination into the
relationship between state courts and administrative agencies is beyond the scope of this article, the
“flavors” of the standards of review of administrative decisions in most states are similar to those
in the federal system. There are exceptions and differences in emphasis; in Oregon, for instance,
courts review agency decisions for procedural flaws and statutory or constitutional violations, but
they do not defer to agency legal determinations. While “substantial evidence” governs judicial
review of agency adjudications, OR. REV. STAT. § 183.400 (2016), Oregon courts do not have
authority to reverse agency decisions if they are arbitrary or capricious—only if they fall outside
the scope of statutory authority. OR. REV. STAT. § 183.482(8)(a)(A).
36. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2015) (providing that agency decisions may be set aside if they
are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
37. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999) (“Traditionally, th[e] court/court [clear error]
standard of review has been considered somewhat stricter ([i.e.], allowing somewhat closer judicial
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is true for factual findings in both informal and formal proceedings.
Although facts found in formal agency proceedings are reviewed for
“substantial evidence”38—rather than for being arbitrary and
capricious—then-Judge Scalia said in 1984 that there is “no substantive
difference” between these two tests that review the validity of factual
findings.39
Discretionary and policy decisions are also reversed only if they are
arbitrary or capricious. This standard is amenable to a wide range of
meanings depending on the intensity of this review. On the one hand,
this appears to be an extremely deferential standard under which the
courts defer to any reasonable and well-informed balance that an agency
appears to strike between competing policy objectives. As long as the
agency has some kind of rational basis for making its decision, the court
will affirm.
On the other hand, courts and academics have also identified a more
intensive level of scrutiny under the arbitrary and capricious standard: a
so-called “hard look” review. Under this “flavor” of arbitrary and
capricious review, the federal courts insist on comprehensive and careful
record building by the agency, and engage in an intensive examination of
that record to ensure that conclusions necessarily follow from identified
facts, that appropriate alternatives were adequately discussed, and that
this information is all available in, and articulated on, the agency’s record
on review.40
Finally, there is the standard of review for questions of law. In the
federal system, at least, review of questions of law as decided by agencies
can be very different than review of questions of law as decided by lower
courts. While appellate review is conducted de novo in the latter case, it
is highly deferential when it comes to reviewing an agency’s
interpretation of law, as long as that interpretation is made in the context
of a statement that carries the force of law—such as rules promulgated
review) than the APA’s court/agency standards.” (citing 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2, at 174 (3d ed. 1994))).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2015).
39. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 6, at 182
(characterizing this statement by then-Judge Scalia as “incomplete”).
40. The paradigmatic “hard look” case is Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding that the Court of Appeals erred by not
“intensifying the scope of its review based upon its reading of legislative events”). See generally
Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN.
L. REV. 753 (2006) (discussing problems with “hard look” review administered by a generalist
court).
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after notice and comment rulemaking—and as long as it is not
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.41
3. Appellate Court Control over Standards of Review
While the general scope of these standards of review is relatively wellfixed in the firmament of appellate procedure, appellate courts retain a
significant amount of discretion with respect to which standard of review
applies, as well as the circumstances under which a standard is met in a
particular case. Such discretion provides opportunities for appellate
courts to drift—whether intentionally or not—from what might be
perceived as an “accepted” interpretation of the appropriate intensity of
review under a given standard.
Appellate courts have substantial control over three significant areas
of standard of review analysis.42
First, they can control the
characterization of a particular question as one of fact, as one of law, or
as a mixed question, thereby leading to a first-order decision regarding
the scope of deference in a particular case. If the question on review is
one of law, the appellate courts will not be deferential; if the question is
one of fact or discretion, the appellate courts will be more deferential; and
if the question is a “mixed question of law and fact,” a more sophisticated
analysis is required. While a trial court judge certainly has substantial
control over how to “set up” this kind of question—by heavily embedding
factual findings into any particular determinations, for instance, in the
hope that the decision will receive more deference—any significant
uncertainty regarding the proper characterization of the issue on review43
remains squarely in the hands of the appellate court.44 Depending on the

41. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)
(noting that if a statute is ambiguous, a court may not “substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency”).
42. This is not to say that appellate courts have plenary authority to determine the scope of
review in every case. There are, of course, many areas of the law where the particular standard of
review is well-settled. In most cases, this fact will preclude an appellate court from exercising any
flexibility on the first point (i.e., whether the question is one of law, fact, or discretion), and limits
the scope of flexibility on the second.
43. Given the often shifting lines between issues of fact and issues of law, the scope of issues
in which there is uncertainty on this point is quite broad.
44. Consider, for instance, the decision in Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of
Fort Berthold Reservation, 238 P.3d 40, 48–49 (Or. 2010), in which the Oregon Court of Appeals
inquired into the proper standard of review for the question whether there was “good cause” to
place Native American children outside of their tribe’s preferred placement. While the parties and
many prior courts had concluded this was an “abuse of discretion” standard, the Oregon Court of
Appeals found otherwise, deeming it a question of law, and reviewable without deference to the
lower court conclusions.
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motivations of the reviewing court, this is a significant power given that
“‘[l]aw’ and ‘fact’ do not in legal discourse denote pre-existing things;
they express policy-grounded legal conclusions.”45
Second, once a court has made the first-order characterization of a
question as “law” or as “fact,” the appellate court can still modify or carve
out the question presented in a way that will dictate the application of a
particular standard of review in a particular case. This is especially likely
when the relevant issue is a “mixed question of law and fact,” and where
the relevant standard has not been clearly determined.46 In these
circumstances, appellate court control over the phrasing of the question
presented, as well as over the ultimate standard used to evaluate that
question, is substantial.47 In this way, reviewing courts can adjust the
phrasing of the standard, or its application in a particular case, to
significantly influence the relationship between the appellate court and
the decision under review.48
Third, once the appellate court determines what the standard of review
actually is, the court retains the power to decide whether the standard of
review has actually been met. An appellate court might characterize a
question on review as one in which it owes deference to the decision
maker below, but then proceed to conclude that the decision below should
be reversed. While sometimes this is the correct result, there still might
be other times in which this outcome is inconsistent with the appropriate
standard. The degree to which courts exercise this discretionary power
over standards of review in a manner inconsistent with expected
outcomes is the focus of much academic skepticism about the predictive
45. Weidner v. Thieret, 866 F.2d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 1989). Judge Posner’s opinion view of this
process might be referred to as an “ad-hoc classification decision.” See Martin B. Louis, Allocating
Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View
of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993,
1005 (1986) (noting that an “ad hoc process for classifying ultimate procedural facts achieves
different results from the presumptive process employed in the realm of substantive law”).
46. It is in connection with identified “mixed questions” where “many scholars observe the
‘struggle for power’ between trial and appellate courts. Over the years, authors have argued that
appellate courts have in fact manipulated the standard of review, often by moving more and more
decisions from deferential review into the de novo category.” Anderson, supra note 31, at 13.
47. Louis, supra note 45, at 1005.
48. In some cases, a given standard of review may even develop formalized “tiers.” Consider,
for instance, the distinction between “standard” arbitrary and capricious review under the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act and so-called “hard look” version of this review. The stated version
of judicial review is the same in both instances—reversal is appropriate only if the agency decision
is “arbitrary or capricious”—but in “hard look” cases, the court takes a much deeper and more
searching and skeptical look at the validity of the agency’s decision. As I only half-jokingly explain
to my administrative law classes, “you know it was ‘hard look’ arbitrary and capricious review
when the agency loses.”
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power of these standards.49
Whether such inconsistency is intentional (i.e., although an appellate
court knows that the decision below should objectively be affirmed, it
reverses on ideological or personal grounds) or unintentional (i.e., the
appellate court mistakenly reverses even though an objective analysis of
the case on review would necessarily result in affirmance), this kind of
“application error” is very difficult to review or reverse.
The difficulty of review is due not only to the uncertainty associated
with the definitions of particular standards, but because cases in which
the standard is an issue rarely draw a higher court’s attention. A single
error of this type would likely be dismissed at the certiorari stage in the
United States Supreme Court as (at worst) an erroneous, fact-bound
application of well-settled law that implicates no circuit splits.50 Even
multiple errors of this kind by a particular circuit court—which might
amount to a “drift” in the application of a standard of review over time
(e.g., treating arbitrary and capricious review more like clear error review
via more regular reversals)—would be unlikely to draw the attention of
the United States Supreme Court, which would still see the circuit court
as relying on a correct statement of law.51 A similar point might be made
with respect to state high court review of state intermediate appellate
courts. The proper application of a given standard of review is difficult
to monitor and correct.
The rationales for why appellate courts might exercise this discretion
are broad: they might feel personal or political sympathy for a particular
party, for instance, or disagree with the underlying policy choices
reflected in the cause of action at issue. Many other studies—particularly
in the social science literature—have examined the role of political and

49. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 31, at 3–4, 9–10 (discussing the discretionary standards).
50. See S. CT. R. 10 (setting forth standards determining appropriate exercise of certiorari
jurisdiction).
51. Persuading the Court to take (and correct) such a drift would be particularly unlikely. First,
making the case for a “drift” would certainly require statistical analysis of a particular circuit’s
reversal rates, but the Supreme Court has proven to be quite skeptical about the value of statistics
about other cases in its review of a single judgment. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564
U.S. 338, 356 (2011) (explaining that statistical evidence can be insufficient for proving legal
theories when the scope of statistical measurement does not match the size of the class or pattern
of behavior in controversy); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987) (attempting to support
the claim of racially discriminatory capital sentencing process with a statistical study). Second, the
flexibility of, and inherent uncertainty regarding, the line between “affirm” and “reverse” for any
standard of review would make it difficult to demonstrate that any given circuit court opinion fell
on the wrong side of that line. While a case need not be wrong to justify a grant of certiorari, it
certainly helps when making the case for the grant.
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policy alignment in how courts make their decisions.52
There are, however, somewhat less nefarious motivations for why
appellate judges might skew the results under a particular standard of
review. For instance, an appellate court’s opinion about the general skill
of a particular decision maker below will often inform the outcome of
close cases. Such individualized deference is, of course, not a part of the
traditional understanding regarding how standards of review are
implemented. Nevertheless,53 as D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia Wald once
conceded:
[T]here is no question the reviewing judges’ perception of the ability of
the trial judge counts heavily. If they consider him capable and
generally astute, they will try harder to uphold him, especially in close
cases. Where errors are asserted, a trial judge of excellent repute will
be given the benefit of every doubt.54

In United States v. Boyd,55 for instance, the Seventh Circuit emphasized
the experience and wisdom of the trial court judge in noting the
deferential nature of the standard of review.56
Others have suggested that a typical “signal” regarding a standard of
review’s reversal rate might be trumped by judicial judgment about the
reviewing court’s own expertise in the area of law under review. In 2002,
for instance, Professor Melissa Hart suggested that the degree of
deference by the United States Supreme Court to agency interpretations
of law was inversely related to the level of judicial familiarity and

52. For studies that examined this role see generally, CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES
POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Jonathan P. Kastellec,
Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the US Courts of Appeals, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
421 (2007); Jonathan P. Kastellec & Jeffrey R. Lax, Case Selection and the Study of Judicial
Politics, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 407 (2008); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997).
53. Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(A): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of
Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 655–56 (1988) (noting that although the prospect
of this kind of individualized deference is “troubling,” it is also likely an accurate description of
how appellate courts function).
54. Wald, supra note 5, at 1381–82.
55. 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995).
56. “[D]uring the trial, Judge Aspen had for months on end listened to witnesses—had heard,
had not merely read, their testimony, and had watched them as they gave it . . . . A trial judge of
long experience, he would have developed a feel for the impact of the witnesses on the jury—and
how that impact might have been different had the government played by the rules—that an
appellate court, confined to reading the transcript, cannot duplicate. Judge Aspen may have been
mistaken; we might suspect that he was mistaken; but unless we are convinced that he was
mistaken, we have no warrant to reverse. That is what it means to say that appellate review is
deferential. It is not abject, but it is deferential.” Id. (citations omitted).
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comfort with the particular area of law in which the agency was acting.57
Noting relatively high reversal rates—and little discussion of
deference—in connection with Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission legal determinations, Professor Hart hypothesized that this
anomalous approach to what should be a deferential standard of review
arose out of the United States Supreme Court’s relative familiarity with
employment and racial discrimination matters in the context of Title VII
and equal protection cases.58 That familiarity, she suggested, had a direct
consequence on the Court’s willingness to defer to agency interpretations
of law that were not otherwise aligned with the Court’s (admittedly
informed) view of how the law should operate in that particular area.59
In addition to many other factors, then, judicial judgments about their
own substantive expertise might trump the signal that Congress or other
legislative bodies may send to courts through the standard of review.60
For the same reasons that appellate court “drift” in the application of a
particular standard would be difficult to catch and resolve,61 it would be
nearly impossible to check an improper application of deference based on
an appellate court’s respect for a particular trial court judge, or on its own
perception of its expertise. These routes to a “non-standard” standard of
review provide another way in which appellate court application of
standards of review might shift away from a “standard” application of
those principles.
There is, then, substantial control exercised by reviewing courts over
the development and application of standards of review in a variety of
57. Melissa J. Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1937, 1949–58 (2006).
58. Id. at 1949–51, 1954–58.
59. Id. at 1954–58.
60. The relevant standard of review here is extracted from the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984). That
standard of review is not directly related to legislative action, although it purports to represent a
mechanism by which the Court carries legislative intent into effect in the review of agency
interpretations of law. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45. Under Step 1, a court simply enforces
Congressional intent as expressed in clear statutory language, while under Step 2, the court views
deference to agency legal interpretations of law as consistent with an implicit Congressional
delegation of authority to the agency to announce clarifying statements of law. Id.
61. See S. CT. R. 10 (emphasizing the compelling character of issues for which certiorari is
granted); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (failing to accept statistical evidence in a
death penalty case); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 356 (2011) (explaining
that statistical evidence can be insufficient for proving legal theories when the scope of statistical
measurement does not match the size of the class or pattern of behavior in controversy); but see
Dukes, 564 U.S. at 372 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that though the Majority disagrees
with the statistical method the court used, “[a]ppellate review is no occasion to disturb a trial court’s
handling of factual disputes of this order”).
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contexts.62 While review of that control might be accomplished by
further appeals, such checks are unlikely to work consistently. There are
opportunities for reviewing courts to deviate from what might be deemed
the “correct” law in this context, and little to be done to correct those
errors—unless, of course, specific shifts in the standard of review can
influence courts to make such shifts over time. This substantial judicial
control over standards of review also suggests that legislative change in
the standards—or even change imposed by superior appellate courts—
might not have as much influence on judicial decision making as one
might assume. Unless courts applying a new standard “buy in” to the
proposed change, there are many ways for reviewing courts to stick with
preexisting understandings about how deferential they will be.
B. History
The historical evolution of standards of review is a matter that is too
involved for this Article to address in great detail, but other scholars have
engaged in that analysis to a substantial degree for those who wish to
examine the development of these doctrines in greater depth.63 A brief
summary is appropriate, however, as it sheds light on the development of
the current distinctions between different standards of review, and into
the rationale behind the adoption of particular standards.
Like so much that emerged from the development of the common law
in the United States, the distinction between law and equity plays a
substantial role in the development of today’s appellate standards of
review. Historically, “equity review [was] a re-examination of the entire
record, on both the facts and the law, while that at law [was] limited to a
consideration of the legal errors which may have been committed by the
trial court.”64 In federal courts, the Judiciary Act of 1789 briefly called
for the use of writ of error principles (which did not allow a factual
review) in the review of decisions in equitable actions.65 Pressure from
the “chancery lawyers” resulted in legislation that repealed this combined
62. “The standard of review . . . is potentially a strategic choice for the appellate court and there
is the possibility that courts manipulate standards of review.” Anderson, supra note 31, at 13.
63. See Erwin N. Griswold & William Mitchell, The Narrative Record in Federal Equity
Appeals, 42 HARV. L. REV. 483, 486–87 (1928) (examining the evolution of standards of review);
see generally CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 27 (describing how appellate lawyers can learn how
to find, frame, and use the standard of review in practice); Clark & Stone, supra note 23 (describing
historical significance of the evolution of standards of review).
64. Clark & Stone, supra note 23, at 190. The Oregon statute that is the subject of Part III.A.
below, reflected this history in that it provided (prior to its 2009 amendment) for de novo review
of “equitable action[s].” OR. REV. STAT. § 19.415 (2009).
65. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
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standard of review in 1803, however, so appellate courts returned to
giving limited deference on review of equitable actions and substantial
deference on review of decisions in actions at law.66 This distinction
remained through 1865, when it was extended to actions at law where
juries and judges were making findings of fact.67 It was only upon the
merger of law and equity in the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that the modern approach to standards of review—based
on the nature of the question on review, rather than the legal or equitable
nature of the cause of action—became dominant.68
This history helps to explain the theoretical development of standards
of review. For nearly 150 years, the primary distinction between modes
of appellate review turned not on definitions of “fact” or “law,” or on the
nature of the relationship between the appellate and trial courts, but rather
it turned on the characterization of the cause of action as one at law or
one in equity. Essentially, the standard of review turned on the role of
the relevant courts in the overall appellate system and the nature of their
powers. Once the transformation of the federal judiciary—as well as the
judiciaries in nearly all other states—into a merged system was
complete,69 the standard of review moved from a discussion about how
best to characterize the role of particular courts (i.e., as “courts of law,”
or “courts of equity”) to a discussion about the nature of particular
questions as ones of “law,” of “fact,” or of “discretion.”
Administrative law standards of review for facts tend to parallel civil
appellate standards, and are similarly influenced by common law history.
But in instances where administrative law differs from civil appellate
court-to-court review (i.e., in giving agencies particularly broad
“arbitrary and capricious” discretion when it comes to policy choices, or
in deferring to reasonable agency interpretations of law that are not
otherwise foreclosed by statute), the variations tend to arise primarily out

66. Clark & Stone, supra note 23, at 193–96; see also Griswold & Mitchell, supra note 63, at
487–89 (examining the evolution of legislative efforts at developing the standard of review,
specifically noting the history of the Act of March 3, 1803).
67. Clark & Stone, supra note 23, at 197–99; see also Griswold & Mitchell, supra note 63, at
513 (noting how district courts in equity cases and in actions at law when the jury was waived were
required to make findings of facts).
68. Another good summary of the history of appeals in equity practice can be found in Maury
Holland & Robert L. Sokol, A Statutory Antique: Rethinking Oregon’s Civil ‘De Novo’ Appellate
Review, 66 OR. ST. B. BULL. 19 (May 2006).
69. The formal merger of law and equity in the federal system came in 1938; in states, some
preceded the federal system with a formal merger, while others did not take formal steps to
complete the merger until well into the twentieth century. As Part III.C. notes below, many state
appellate systems still retain vestigial parts of the distinctions between the two systems.

21_DOBBINS_DOCUMENT4 (205-251).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

226

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

1/23/17 9:44 AM

[Vol. 48

of a motivation that recognizes that administrative agencies are different
institutions from trial courts, and they play different roles in the legal
system. In both civil and administrative systems of review, then, the
relevant standard of review is rooted in historical and current
understandings about the relative role of the deciding and reviewing
institutions within the overall system.
C. Purposes
A historical perspective, then, emphasizes the importance of
institutional roles in the development and maintenance of the current
standards of review. Under this perspective, a standard of review is
fundamentally a mechanism that describes—and, perhaps, mediates70—
the relationship between the reviewing court and the decision maker
under review. It represents a tangible means of measuring the relative
authority and competence of the two decision-making bodies—the
reviewing court and the entity (usually the trial court or an agency) that
issued the decision under review—that are a necessary part of any review
process.71 As one commentator suggested, “[t]he organization of the
federal judiciary is premised on the division of labor between trial and
appellate courts, the boundaries of which are delineated by the standards
of review.”72 The same might also be said of state judiciaries.
Other factors explain and influence standards of review, of course.
“There are, to be sure, many additional considerations governing the
allocation of responsibilities between the trial and appellate levels,
including judicial economy, the enhancement of public regard for the
functioning of the judicial system, and the need for both consistent
decisions and clear rules.” But in the end, however, “[i]t is clear . . . that
institutional competence is the dominant consideration” associated with
the creation and definition of standards of review.73
Implicit in this explanation for the standard of review is the notion that
when one court has more “expertise” in playing a particular role within
the appellate system, it will issue “better” decisions in that particular area
than another entity might. For example, appellate courts typically give

70. This is the assumption, at least, of those who emphasize the importance of standards of
review in appellate rhetoric.
71. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 31, at 44–48 (explaining that institutional competence—
“the idea that by their situation or their experience[,] the trial judges find facts better than appellate
judges”—is the most common reason for deferential review).
72. Id. at 6.
73. Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction,
57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 445 (2004).
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less deference to trial courts in questions of law because they are viewed
as having particular expertise in making—and, in fact, they are designed
to ensure—good legal decisions. By contrast, some view trial courts to
be better than appellate courts at gathering, assessing, and evaluating
facts, even if the trial court’s evidence is purely documentary. Therefore,
appellate review of facts is highly deferential to trial court findings (or
jury findings).74
Given this background, one might think of standards of review as
describing—rather than prescribing—the nature of the authority and
competencies of the institutions involved in appellate review. Under this
theory regarding the function of standards of review, one would expect
institutions to be relatively resistant to a change in a standard of review,
unless the change simultaneously occurred with a shift in the underlying
understanding about that relationship. Similarly, one would expect that
data regarding reversal rates would reflect the importance of standards
between different types of cases because the standards track established
understandings. Ultimately, however, one might expect this effect to be
rather weak because appellate court control over the application of a
standard, and the influence of the court’s perception of its role in the
process, is likely to be more significant than the “forcing” effects
associated with the language of the standard itself.
D. Does a Different Standard Affect Outcomes?
1. Different Standards Affect Outcomes (Circumstantial Evidence)
Circumstantial evidence suggests that the standard of review matters
significantly. Generally speaking, of course, the standard itself is phrased
as a decision rule; the reviewing court may not reverse unless the standard
of review has been met. Not surprisingly, an effective appellate attorney
therefore spends a substantial amount of time crafting briefs and
preparing his or her oral argument with the standard of review in mind.
Appellate judges add to the perceived importance of the standard because
their decisions can dwell extensively on the standard and whether it is
met in a particular case. Given the focus on the standard in each appellate
case, it is not at all unreasonable to assume that a given standard makes a
difference to the outcome of the issue on review.
74. “[T]he degree of deference accorded the trial judges is designed to promote the better
functioning of the judicial process. In some circumstances, it has been believed, the trial judge is
in a better position to make a correct decision than are appellate judges.” MEADOR ET AL., supra
note 1, at 222; but cf. Oldfather, supra note 73, at 440 (arguing that sometimes appellate courts are
better than district courts in evaluating factual findings).
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This assumption is reinforced by the obligation of appellate counsel to
include a statement regarding the standard of review applicable to their
particular case in their opening briefs. In the federal system, the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure have included such a requirement since
1993, and individual circuits asked for such a statement for many years
prior to that.75 State courts generally impose similar requirements.76 The
mandatory nature of these statements emphasizes the importance of these
standards in the minds of practitioners and judges.
Similarly, courts regularly spend a significant amount of time in cases
evaluating the standard of review. Specifically, cases in which no
standard is currently established require parties and the courts to expend
significant resources in evaluating and deciding on the relevant standard.
The language of the standards certainly suggests their value. And this
seems to make sense; as a rhetorical matter, there is a substantial
difference between a case where an appellate court can reverse only when
the decision below is “arbitrary and capricious,” and a case where an
appellate court’s review is de novo. It is not particularly difficult to
theoretically imagine a case in which the court believes the decision
below to is incorrect, but perhaps not so incorrect that it amounts to an
arbitrary decision worthy of reversal. As courts repeatedly remind
practitioners in discussing deferential standards of review, a court using
such a standard may not reverse merely because the court believes the
decision below to be incorrect; rather, the court reverses only when the
decision below cannot be supported. Ultimately, the focus of courts,
practitioners, and observers on the standard of review provides strong
anecdotal evidence that they make a difference.
75. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(B) (requiring “for each issue, a concise statement of the applicable
standard of review”). The Advisory Committee notes accompanying the adoption of the rule noted
that “five circuits currently require these statements.” Id. (noting the 1993 Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rules).
76. OR. R. APP. P. 5.45(5) (“Under the subheading ‘Standard of Review,’ each assignment of
error shall identify the applicable standard or standards of review, supported by citation to the
statute, case law, or other legal authority for each standard of review.”). The Oregon rules also
helpfully set forth a range of options so that there is no mistaking to what the rule refers. OR. R.
APP. P. 5.45(5) n. 2 (“Standards of review include but are not limited to de novo and substantive
review for factual issues, errors of law and abuse of discretion for legal issues, and special statutory
standards of review.”). See also ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 13(a)(7)(B) (requiring statement of “the
applicable standard of appellate review with citation to supporting legal authority”); COLO. APP. R.
28(k) (requiring, “[f]or each issue raised on appeal, . . . under a separate heading placed before
discussion of the issue: (1) a concise statement of the applicable standard of appellate review with
citation to authority.”); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(b)(5) (briefs shall contain “Argument with regard to
each issue, with citation to appropriate authorities, and including the applicable appellate standard
of review”). Not all courts explicitly require such a statement, apparently assuming that counsel
will rely on their training and writing skills. E.g., CAL. R. APP. PRO.; WISC. R. APP. PRO.
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Furthermore, despite the uncertainty in some areas of the law, there are
particular questions for which the relevant appellate standard is wellestablished. Even when there is no clear guidance on the standard of
review, at least some commentators have dubbed the “basic test for
whether deferential review is appropriate” (i.e., the determination of
whether a question of law or a question of fact is under review) to be
“remarkably functional” in its focus on the simple questions of
competence of the relevant decision-making body.77 Perceiving the
straightforward nature of this baseline test, many judges continue to argue
for the importance of the traditional emphasis on the choice between
different standards.78 In response to academic skepticism regarding the
importance of standards of review, for instance, one judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit characterized that skepticism as
“misguided” and “cynical.”79 As the next section demonstrates, this
perception is reflected, at least in part, by the empirical literature that
finds an outcome-oriented effect of standards of review.
2. Different Standards Affect Outcomes (Empirical Findings)
Empirical data seem to provide the best opportunity to determine
whether a standard of review matters to appellate outcomes. Some
empirical studies suggest that standards of review make a difference, at
least in certain circumstances.80 This evidence is limited, however; as
one 2012 study noted, the question of whether the reversal rate correlates
with the standard of review had not been empirically studied until
recently.81
A 2010 empirical investigation conducted by Corey Rayburn Yung
concluded that standards of review did matter.82 Based on his
examination of federal appellate cases issued in 2008,83 Yung found that
appeals using a de novo standard of review resulted in reversal
approximately 25.5 percent of the time, appeals using an abuse of
discretion standard of review led to reversal about 15 percent of the time,
77. Anderson, supra note 31, at 15.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 2–6 (describing the traditional distinction between
standards).
79. EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 6, at v.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 82–93 (describing such empirical studies).
81. Anderson, supra note 31, at 10–11 (citing Yung, supra note 15, at 1136). While both Yung
and Anderson’s studies of this question were driven primarily by efforts to characterize the effect
of ideological leanings on case outcomes, they each examined whether the standard of review made
a difference in reversal rates in the course of conducting that investigation.
82. Yung, supra note 15, at 1159.
83. Id. at 1155–56.
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and cases involving clear error review led to a 12 percent rate of
reversal.84 Despite the conventional wisdom of social science that “law
has almost no influence on” judges,85 Yung found that the spectrum of
review seemed to have predictive value, and concluded that standards of
review did influence the reversal rate.86
In Yung’s study, however, there were some potentially confounding
factors. Most concerning, perhaps, was that because of the search
algorithm used, the dataset included only those cases in which the
appellate court “used language relevant to a standard of review.”87 This
would seem to be a particularly difficult selection problem if one is
attempting to determine whether standards of review are appropriately
applied across all appellate cases because one would expect the standards
to be most clearly articulated in cases where the court wanted to hew the
standard itself—whether that involved reversing or affirming in the cases
where the standard mattered. It does not seem surprising, then, that the
effect of the standard seemed particularly strong in Yung’s study.
Yung’s result was replicated, with some subtle differences, in Robert
Anderson’s 2012 study. In that study, Anderson concluded that,
“deferential standards of review appear to considerably decrease the
probability of outright reversal.”88 Curiously, however, they did not
increase the probability of affirmance.89 Anderson suggested that this
might be due to “mixed” outcomes (i.e., partial affirmance and partial
reversal), which seemed to increase with more deferential standards of
review.90 So while there was some relationship to reversal, his data did
“not show the clear relationship between the affirm/reverse decision
expected by the legal model [which assumes that judges attempt to
comply with legal standards, without reference to outside
considerations], but instead show[ed] some surprisingly nuanced
relationships among the standards of review and the outcome of the
appeal.”91
84. Id. at 1161 fig.1.
85. Id. at 1161 n.217 (citing Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do With It? Judicial
Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465,
466 (2001)).
86. Yung, supra note 15, at 1160–61.
87. Id. at 1195; see also id. at 1156 n.188 (describing the Lexis search that returned examined
cases).
88. Anderson, supra note 31, at 5.
89. Id. at 23–26.
90. Id. at 25.
91. Id. at 24. A skeptic might argue that “surprisingly nuanced” results associated with what
should be a straightforward spectrum of standards (i.e., the hypothesis that more deference leads to
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One of the central findings of Anderson’s study is that standards of
review provide a mechanism through which differences in standards of
review might alter rates of reversal. It suggests that the fact of
deference—whether accurate or not—might incentivize trial courts to
write their decisions in a way that grounds their opinions in deferentially
reviewed rationales.92 The idea that trial courts act strategically to
modify their decisions and take advantage of the deference that appellate
courts owe is not unusual,93 but Anderson is not able to directly test
whether this supposed manipulation of the standard of review works (i.e.,
whether it leads to different reversal rates at the reviewing court level).
In a 2011 study by Fischman and Schanzenbach, their data suggested,
but did not affirmatively demonstrate, that appellate courts are
“constrained by standards of review.”94 This study focused on whether
district court judges were influenced by changes in the standard of review
associated with departures from the federal sentencing guidelines.95
Fischman and Schanzenbach concluded that district courts were affected
by the change to a more deferential standard of review.96 They further
hypothesized that this effect would take place only if appellate court
judges were constrained by review standards, and suggested that their
work “provide[s] indirect evidence that circuit court panels are also
constrained by standards of review.”97
On the other hand, the evidence gathered by Fischman and
Schanzenbach could be explained differently. It seems equally likely that
district courts could change their behavior based on the perception that
appellate courts were changing theirs, without actually being able to
predict (or determine after appeal) whether appellate courts were actually
changing their behavior given the change in the standard of review. As
long as parties and the trial courts believed that appellate courts were
going to be lenient, perhaps, they decided to depart more often. Thus,
Fischman and Schanzenbach might be correct that trial courts are
“meaningfully constrained by the prospect of appellate reversal,”98 but
that might well be true even if trial courts had no idea whether the
more affirmance) are evidence that the hypothesis is incorrect.
92. Id. at 9 (examining several models for how standards of review work in the federal system).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 94–97 (describing empirical studies on district court
behavior and “constrained” standards of review).
94. Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? The Case
of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 406 (2011).
95. Id. at 406. One of the changes to the standard that is encompassed within the study is the
change that is the topic of Part II.B., below.
96. Id. at 431.
97. Id. at 406.
98. Id. at 405.
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likelihood of appellate reversal was going to change. It would seem very
difficult for trial courts to accurately predict whether a certain departure
might be subject to reversal in a given case—let alone whether the
statistical evidence might suggest such an outcome. For a trial court
judge, the outcome of an appeal is not a statistical reversal rate—it is
either “affirmed” or “reversed”—and it seems unlikely that the trial court
judge would have the necessary data with which to evaluate statistical
changes in the risk of such a result. Thus, while Fischman and
Schanzenbach may be right that reversal rates differ with a changed
standard of review, that conclusion is not necessarily mandated by their
findings.
Finally, Yung’s and Anderson’s studies,99 at least, confirmed earlier
work conducted by Frank Cross on published federal appellate court
decisions from 1928 to 1988.100 In his work, Cross found that standards
of review seemed to influence outcomes in certain civil appeals, and that
the spectrum of standards correlated with reversal rates in cases involving
review of decisions by federal administrative agencies.101
Collectively, the above studies suggest that the standard of review does
make a difference to appellate practice. Yet, other information suggests
the contrary.102
3. Different Standards Do Not Affect Outcomes (Circumstantial
Evidence)
For every statement by a practitioner that standards of review make all
the difference in the world, there are equal numbers of statements
99. See Anderson, supra note 31, at 50 (examining in both studies the effects of standards of
review in reversal rates); Yung, supra note 15, at 1159–61 (examining Cross’ empirical studies
regarding the connection between standards of review and reversal rates).
100. See generally Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 1457 (2003) (examining determinants of decision making in the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals by conducting an empirical study of determinants, using a database that
includes thousands of decisions).
101. See id. at 1501–03 (finding inverse correlation between reversal rates and magnitude of
anticipated deference to trial court decisions (like summary judgment, review of jury trial decisions,
and review of denials of post-trial motions)). In the case of agencies, the affirmance rates across
several standards of review varied by less than 10 percent, ranging from 67 percent affirmance in
de novo review cases to 75 percent affirmance in reviews deploying the arbitrary and capricious
test. While the order of reversal rates is what one would expect (the more substantial the deference,
the more likely the court was to affirm), the spread seems narrower than one might hypothesize
based on judicial descriptions of the strength of these standards. Cf. Verkuil, supra note 16, at 689
(hypothesizing de novo affirmance rates of 50 percent and arbitrary and capricious affirmance rates
of 85 to 90 percent, but not discussing whether the small differences are statistically significant).
102. See infra Parts I.D.3–4 (noting circumstantial evidence and empirical findings that support
the idea that different standards do not affect outcomes).
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suggesting the contrary. Many of these statements come from academics
evaluating the importance of standards of review. For example, Gellhorn
and Robinson famously stated that in the context of judicial review of
administrative decisions, “the rules governing judicial review have no
more substance at the core than a seedless grape.”103 Nor is it particularly
unusual for courts to challenge practitioners with the (apparently
difficult) task of finding decisions where differences in the standard
would really matter,104 or even for courts to suggest that certain
differences in the characterization of the standard of review are likely to
be irrelevant.105 Judge Richard Posner suggested that there are
effectively just two standards—deferential, and not—and that other
standards with subtle differences are not “actually capable of being drawn
in the practice of appellate review.”106 One commentator suggested, in
evaluating the “clearly erroneous” language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52, that the phrase does not have an “intrinsic meaning. It is
elastic, capacious, malleable, and above all variable. Because it means
nothing, it can mean anything and everything that it ought to mean. It
cannot be defined, unless the definition might enumerate a nearly infinite
number of shadings along the spectrum of working review standards.”107
Even more fundamentally, some have pointed out that the “distinction
between the terms ‘law’ and ‘fact’ is malleable at best, and the
malleability is not entirely unwelcome to the judges who wield the
terms.”108 Ultimately, some suggest, “it may be that the standards
governing appellate review in fact provide very little governance at
all.”109
103. Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 771, 780 (1975).
104. See, e.g., Rose v. State, No. 59141, 2013 WL 3297397, at *3 (Nev. May 13, 2013) (noting
that counsel “offers no cogent argument as to how a different standard of review on appeal would
have affected the outcome of either the trial or the appeal”).
105. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Wisconsin Dells v. Z.S., ex rel. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 676 (7th
Cir. 2002) (noting Judge Posner’s opinion that even if the lower court applied the wrong standard
of review in the case at bar, it was harmless); see also Ass’n of Data Processing v. Bd. of Governors,
745 F.2d 677, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting Justice Scalia’s opinion that the “‘substantial evidence’
requirement . . . demands a quantum of factual support no different from that demanded by the
substantial evidence provision . . . which is in turn no different from that demanded by the arbitrary
and capricious standard”); but see EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 6, at 182–83 (challenging
Justice Scalia).
106. United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995).
107. Cooper, supra note 53, at 645.
108. Anderson, supra note 31, at 12; see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) (“[T]he
appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to
say the least, elusive.”).
109. Oldfather, supra note 73, at, 439.
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The wide range of discretion that appellate courts wield in choosing
and implementing particular standards110 provides reviewing courts with
substantial opportunities to deviate from the typical “textbook description
of the adjudicatory process”111 under which they impartially strive to
implement established rules of legal reasoning to evaluate the validity of
the lower court’s decision. If that is true, one would expect the
availability of this discretion to confirm the skepticism of observers by
showing itself in empirical studies on the effect that standards of review
have on outcomes. As described in the next section, some studies do, in
fact, conclude that reversal rates are not affected by changes in the
standard of review.
4. Different Standards Do Not Affect Outcomes (Empirical Findings)
Uncertainty in the findings of some of the above studies—specifically
in Anderson’s study112—suggests that there is not a straightforward
relationship between the standard of review and the outcomes. Perhaps
the most important study that directly contradicts such a proposition is
the 2002 study by Paul Verkuil.113 In his study, Verkuil examined the
reversal rates on review of three different types of agency decisions:
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) disability determinations,
Veterans’ Disability determinations, and Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”) decisions.114 The decisions were all reviewed under very
different standards: (1) by statute, SSA disability decisions are reversed
on factual grounds only if they are not supported by “substantial
evidence”115; (2) fact finding in Veterans’ disability determinations is
reviewed for clear error116; and (3) FOIA decisions are, by law, reviewed
de novo.117 Based on these standards, Verkuil hypothesized that the SSA
decisions would be reversed rarely (i.e., at a 15 to 25 percent rate), and
FOIA decisions relatively often (surviving review only about 50 percent
of the time), with the reversal rate for Veterans’ Disability determinations

110. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the discretion appellate courts have in choosing the standard
of review).
111. Anderson, supra note 31, at 2.
112. Id. at 24–25.
113. See generally Verkuil, supra note 16 (arguing that relevant standards of review do not
reflect reversal rates).
114. Id. at 702–18.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2015); see Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002)
(reviewing the denial of benefits only to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports the final
decision and whether the Commissioner used the proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence).
116. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4) (2015).
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2015).
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somewhere between the two (around 20 to 30 percent).118
After reviewing years of decisions, however, Verkuil found nearly the
opposite.119 FOIA decisions were affirmed nearly 90 percent of the time,
despite being subject to de novo review.120 He also found that SSA
disability decisions, by contrast, were reversed nearly half the time.121
And, further, Veterans’ disability decisions were the only decisions found
close to meeting Verkuil’s hypothesized reversal rates.122 Verkuil
concluded that the hypothetical reversal rates were nearly useless in
predicting relative outcomes between these different areas of the law, and
that the hypothesized reversal rates “dramatically” failed to
materialize.123
Part of the difficulty with Verkuil’s examination is that the different
reversal rates arise out of altogether different decisions made by entirely
different decision-making bodies. While it certainly demonstrates the
fallacy of the proposition that standards of review are consistent and
meaningful across all comparisons, his study also might suggest that there
are simply strong differences in the way that courts approach the
underlying substantive area of law, or in how courts perceive the quality
of agencies, or at least the quality of agency decision making within
particular substantive areas.124
Other studies support the conclusion that standards of review do not
necessarily predict outcomes—or at least that they do not completely do
so. For instance, while judicial findings of fact in civil and criminal
courts are both subject to a clear error standard of review, “mounting
empirical evidence . . . suggests that appellate courts routinely reexamine
the evidence supporting a trial verdict in civil cases, but almost never do
so in criminal cases.”125 The test for overturning a jury verdict is no
different in the two systems; therefore, the difference in reversal rates
demonstrates that the standard of review is being modified by other
118. Verkuil, supra note 16, at 689.
119. Id. at 719.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. His work suggests that there would be great value in examining reversal rates among
different types of decisions made by the same agency to determine whether judicial skepticism (or
comfort) regarding the validity of agency decisions changed as the nature of the substantive areas
changed (i.e., perhaps SSA’s decisions in a different area of benefits varies substantially from the
reversal rates for disability determinations), or if the reversal rates work of particular agencies
remained consistent to the agencies.
125. Oldfather, supra note 73, at 439 (collecting cases). As Oldfather notes, this should be an
“astonishing revelation” given the constitutionally-driven understanding of the importance of
skepticism when it comes to criminal convictions. Id. at 441–42.
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considerations.
At the very least, this collected empirical evidence suggests that
standards of review might not always do a particularly good job of
predicting reversal rates. If that is true—at least sometimes—and if the
standards are so malleable that a particular standard (even if it is clearly
the one that should be applicable) might not be applied in a predictable
way, then the underlying validity of how standards of review affect
outcomes should be questioned.
5. Additional Evidence Regarding the Effect and Nature of Appellate
Standards of Review
One final set of studies is worth mentioning. In cooperation with
several other academics, Ted Eisenberg examined appellate reversal rates
in both federal and state courts in an effort to ascertain whether there is
some kind of systemic bias among appellate court judges.126 In both
cases, Eisenberg concluded that there was a consistent bias against
plaintiffs at the appellate level.127
That conclusion is only so useful in evaluating the question at issue in
this Article: whether a change in the standard of review changes the rate
of reversal. While ideology or general predilections for one party or
another might drive absolute differences in reversal rates, the primary
focus of this Article is on the relative difference in reversal rates as courts
move from one standard of review to another. Even if courts were to
abandon standards of review altogether and appellate courts simply
reversed if a trial court was “wrong,” the party biases identified by
Eisenberg would presumably still exist in differential reversal rates. But
the critical issue in this Article is whether the difference in standards of
review results in different reversal rates.
The Eisenberg studies provide one interesting and useful point for
purposes of this Article: they reveal that appellate reversal rates are
affected, at least in part, by appellate court perceptions of the work of trial
courts and advocates within them. The results of the Eisenberg studies
“suggest that appellate court attitudes and assumptions about trial courts
likely shape the observed pattern of appeals’ outcomes even after
126. Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical Study
of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 125 (2009); see Kevin Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from
Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 949 (2002) (contrasting trial court bias and
appellate court bias and finding that “[a]ppellate courts are indeed more favorable to defendants
than are trial judges and juries”).
127. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 126, at 124; Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 949.
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accounting for the selection of cases to appeal.”128 If one assumes that
plaintiffs and defendants face similar standards of review,129 the
Eisenberg studies suggest that the reversal rate under the same standard
is nevertheless different, and that the standard of review, in itself, is a
poor predictor of reversal rates.130 Those studies do not, however,
perceive the difference to be rooted in ideology, invidious bias, or general
opposition to “plaintiffs.” Their conclusion is that this “asymmetry”
problem is rooted in the appellate courts’ (mis?)perception of excess trial
court (and especially excess jury) tolerance for plaintiffs at the trial court
level.131
There are, then, hints in the above information that differences in
reversal rates are driven not by a strict application of the standards, but
by a direct perception of relative institutional competence. One should
not dismiss the possibility that scope of any difference in reversal rates
for different standards of review expands or contracts based on other
factors—such as judicial politics, background, training, or the general
nature of a given case.132 This Article, however, contends that the best
way to test the underlying questions—do different standards of review
affect outcomes, and if so, how?—is by examining situations in which
similar (or identical) decision makers, facing a similar (or identical) mix
of cases, are suddenly faced with a change in the stated standard of
review. Part II is directed to that task.
II. CHANGING STANDARDS OF REVIEW: THREE EXAMPLES
A. Discretionary De Novo Review in Equitable Actions or Proceedings
in Oregon, 2005–2014
Prior to 2009, the Oregon Court of Appeals was required, pursuant to
Oregon Revised Statutes (“ORS”) 19.415(3), “[u]pon an appeal from a
judgment in an equitable proceeding,” to try the case “anew upon the

128. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 126, at 124; see Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 126, at
949 (noting that appellate judges lean in favor of the defendant potentially as a result of their
misperceptions about trial courts’ reputation of being pro-plaintiff).
129. This may not be the case; given the different postures that the parties face, as well as the
plaintiffs’ burden of proof, their analysis regarding whether to appeal from adverse rulings in
particular areas may change the balance of issues—and therefore the balance of standards—that
the parties bring on appeal.
130. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 126, at 123–24.
131. Id. at 144–45.
132. There are hints of these effects in some of the above-referenced articles, many of which
seek to evaluate the effect (for instance) of ideology on reversal rates or on trial court decisions.
E.g., Anderson, supra note 31, at 10–18.
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record.”133 As a 2006 commentary on this provision noted, its roots could
be found in the historical lines between courts of law and courts of
equity.134 As an historical matter, appeals in equity cases were viewed as
“more akin to retrials, whereby they would be ‘tried anew upon and
regard to all questions both of law and fact presented by the
transcript,’”135 than to appeals of common law cases, in which appellate
review of factual findings was, and remains, severely circumscribed by
both federal and state Constitutional limitations.136 This statute, then,
was viewed as establishing—or, perhaps more accurately, retaining—“de
novo appellate review of fact findings in equity cases.”137
As was true in many jurisdictions with this mode of appellate review
in equity cases, the Oregon state courts developed an approach to the
review of facts in equity cases that was nevertheless quite deferential. As
Charles Clark noted in 1936, many courts then adhered to the old line of
demarcation between no review of fact in cases at law, and de novo
review in cases at equity, but construed “away its force by extensive
application of the presumption in favor of the trial court’s finding.”138
This was the case in Oregon; even in cases that were understood to call
for the review of facts “anew upon the record,” the appellate court would
defer to a trial court’s findings of fact, reasoning that the trial court’s
ability to observe witnesses and hear testimony “should be given great
weight.”139 Thus, despite the statutory call for de novo review, the courts
gave significant weight to their perception of the institutional
competencies of the two courts.
The nature of appellate review under this Oregon statute became so
deferential that at least some courts occasionally characterized their de
novo review of facts in these cases through the language of entirely
133. Prior to 2009’s amendment, OR. REV. STAT. § 19.415(3) (2005) provided: “(3) Upon
appeal from a judgment in an equitable proceeding the Court of Appeals shall try the cause anew
upon the record.”
134. Holland & Sokol, supra note 68, at 19.
135. Id. at 19 n.4 (citing Heatherly v. Hadley, 4 Or. 1, 9 (1869)).
136. See OR. CONST. art. VII (amended), § 3 (“[N]o fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of this state, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to
support the verdict . . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.”).
137. Holland & Sokol, supra note 68, at 19 n.4 (emphasis omitted).
138. Clark & Stone, supra note 23, at 215.
139. Paulson v. Paulson, 404 P.2d 199, 202 (Or. 1965); see Cline v. Larson, 418 383 P.2d 74,
89 (Or. 1963) (noting that in equity cases, when “the inferences and innuedoes to be drawn from
the testimony are several, great reliance is to be placed upon the findings of the trial judge”) (citing
Clauder v. Morser, 282 P.2d 352, 358 (Or. 1955)).
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different standards of review. In 1998, for instance, the Oregon Court of
Appeals reversed findings of fact from a circuit court decision in an
equitable matter; in doing so, it stated “[o]n de novo review, ORS
19.415(3)[,] we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence that
plaintiff satisfied all the requisite elements of her adverse possession
claim and that there is no basis for estopping her from asserting it. We
therefore reverse.”140
The original version of ORS 19.415(3), then, was viewed as one of
“Oregon’s most anachronistic statutes, a veritable museum piece of an
enactment,” and the courts apparently viewed the teachings of the statute
with skepticism.141 In 2009, the Judicial Department asked the legislature
to amend the statute “to conserve court resources.”142 As is suggested by
the Judicial department’s justification for the change, the courts believed
that the change would not alter the rate of reversal—despite the shift from
de novo to “clear error” review.143 Rather, the courts believed that this
change would make the appellate process easier by limiting the scope of
factual recitations in the briefs and the degree to which the Courts
believed that they had to recite facts in their opinions.144 Based on this
request, the Oregon Legislative Assembly amended ORS 19.415(3), thus
giving the Court discretion to review cases de novo, but not requiring it
to do so.145 The statute retained the de novo requirement for cases
140. Meier v. Rieger, 954 P.2d 786, 788 (Or. Ct. App. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by
Hoffman v. Freeman Land and Timber, LLC, 994 P.2d 106 (Or. 1999) (emphasis omitted).
141. Holland & Sokol, supra note 68, at 19.
142. See S. 262, 75th Legis. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009) (“[Senate Bill] 262A was introduced
on behalf of the Judicial Department in an effort to streamline court functions and reduce costs.
Oregon is one of the few states that provides universal de novo—that is, trying the case anew on
the record—review in equity cases. [Senate Bill] 262A requires de novo review in only a few types
of cases in order to conserve court resources.” (emphasis omitted)).
143. Id.
144. Notes of Court of Appeals Chief Judge D. Brewer, Remarks at Continuing Legal Education
Program (Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Brewer, CLE Remarks] (on file with the author).
145. Or. Rev. Stat. §19.415(3) (2009). After the amendment, the statute provided:
(3) Upon an appeal in an equitable action or proceeding, review by the Court of Appeals
shall be as follows:
(a) Upon an appeal from a judgment in a proceeding for the termination of parental
rights, the Court of Appeals shall try the cause anew upon the record; and
(b) Upon an appeal in an equitable action or proceeding other than an appeal from
a judgment in a proceeding for the termination of parental rights, the Court of
Appeals, acting in its sole discretion, may try the cause anew upon the record or
make one or more factual findings anew upon the record.
(4) When the Court of Appeals has tried a cause anew upon the record or has made one
or more factual findings anew upon the record, the Supreme Court may limit its review
of the decision of the Court of Appeals to questions of law.).
Id.
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involving the termination of parental rights; this carve-out was rooted in
opposition from attorneys practicing family law who believed that such
cases were significant enough that they merited plenary fact review by
the appellate courts.146
The Oregon Court of Appeals adopted rules governing the
circumstances in which the Court of Appeals will exercise this
discretionary de novo review process. Pursuant to Oregon Rule of
Appellate Procedure 5.40, “[i]n those proceedings in which the Court of
Appeals has discretion to try the cause anew on the record and the
appellant seeks to have the court exercise that discretion, the appellant
shall concisely state the reasons why the court should do so.”147 When
appellants ask the Court of Appeals to change factual findings that a
circuit court made below, the appellant is required to “identify with
particularity the factual findings that the appellant seeks to have the court
find anew on the record and shall concisely state the reasons why the
court should do so.”148 The Court of Appeals has stated that it will
“exercise its discretion to try the cause anew on the record or to make one
or more factual findings anew on the record only in exceptional cases,”
and that requests to do so are “disfavored.”149 The Court has also set
forth several factors it will use in evaluating whether it should exercise
its de novo authority, including questions about the nature of the trial
court’s factual findings and the degree to which the trial court’s findings
were incorrect.150
146. See Holland & Sokol, supra note 68, at 22 (noting opposition of family law bar).
147. OR. R. APP. P. 5.40(8)(a).
148. OR. R. APP. P. 5.40(8)(b).
149. OR. R. APP. P. 5.40(8)(c).
150. OR. R. APP. P. 5.40(8)(d) provides:
(d) The Court of Appeals considers the items set out below to be relevant to the decision
whether to exercise its discretion to try the cause anew on the record or make one or
more factual findings anew on the record. These considerations, which are neither
exclusive nor binding, are published to inform and assist the bar and the public.
(i) Whether the trial court made express factual findings, including demeanor-based
credibility findings.
(ii) Whether the trial court’s decision comports with its express factual findings or
with uncontroverted evidence in the record.
(iii) Whether the trial court was specifically alerted to a disputed factual matter and
the importance of that disputed factual matter to the trial court’s ultimate
disposition of the case or to the assignment(s) of error raised on appeal.
(iv) Whether the factual finding(s) that the appellant requests the court find anew
is important to the trial court’s ruling that is at issue on appeal (i.e., whether an
appellate determination of the facts in appellant’s favor would likely provide a basis
for reversing or modifying the trial court’s ruling).
(v) Whether the trial court made an erroneous legal ruling, reversal or modification
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This summary of the factors emphasizes one point that the appellate
courts stressed in requesting this change: the assertion that the Court of
Appeals would not intentionally change its rate of reversal in cases that
fit within the scope of the statute. According to the chief judge of the
Court of Appeals at the time, if the Court had believed that the case
merited reversal under the old, de novo-required statute, the Court would
also choose, under the amended statute, to use its de novo review
authority.151 Curiously, this meant that, after the amendment, one would
generally not expect to see cases in which the Court reversed based on a
conclusion that there was “no evidence” to support the facts found by the
trial court. In those cases, the Court would instead choose to utilize de
novo review and reverse using the less deferential standard.
Therefore, while the Court of Appeals did not think that its reversal
rate would change at all, it did hope that the flexibility provided by the
statute would limit the temptation for parties to set out extended factual
discussions in their briefs, and that it would also permit the Court to limit
its own discussion of the facts in its opinions. The goal, then, was not to
change reversal rates, but to improve the efficiency of the Court’s
briefing, consideration, and opinion-drafting process.
To test the Court’s predictions regarding the unchanged reversal
rates—as well as its predictions regarding the length of factual
discussions in briefs and appellate opinions—this Article examines all
Court of Appeals cases from 2006 to 2008, and from 2012 to 2013,152
that cited ORS 19.415, or that referenced the option of de novo review in
equitable proceedings. For each case, and for the purposes of this Article,
it was determined which standard of review the Court used in evaluating
the facts of the case, the length of the opening brief’s statement of facts,
and the length of any statement of facts in the Court’s opinion.153
of which would substantially alter the admissible contents of the record (e.g., a
ruling on the admissibility of evidence), and determination of factual issues on the
altered record in the Court of Appeals, rather than remand to the trial court for
reconsideration, would be judicially efficient.
151. Brewer, CLE Remarks, supra note 144.
152. I initially planned on using three years of data on both sides of the 2009 amendments. The
amendments only applied to cases filed after the 2009 effective date of the statute, and to avoid any
possible effects associated with the transition from one standard to another, I avoided the years
immediately surrounding that transition. On further review, however, most of the reported cases
decided in 2011 involved appeals filed before the effective date of the amendment, so I excluded
cases decided in 2011, and I was unwilling to add 2014 cases because the court expanded by three
judges in early 2014, and I believed that the additional judges—not so much the fact that there were
different judges, but rather the fact that the court’s capacity expanded—would have complicated
the results of the analysis.
153. This necessarily required some judgment in cases where the arguments in the brief, or the
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One initial consideration immediately jumps out from the data: nearly
twice as many cases reference ORS 19.415(3) in the post-amendment
period than in the pre-amendment period.154 While the Court’s caseload
did increase to some degree over this period, the increase was not
proportional. But there are some potential explanations for this increase.
First, the fact of the amendment—and the surrounding discussion of its
relevance—as well as the presence of the Court’s new rules regarding the
discretionary standard have drawn the attention of parties to the potential
for de novo review. There might be cases in the pre-amendment period
in which (at least in theory) de novo review might have been appropriate,
but in which neither the parties nor the Court chose to raise the question.
This Article postulates that all of the “missing” pre-2009 cases—if there
are any—are likely to be affirmances. If the Court were to reverse on the
alternative “clear error” or “any evidence” standard that would have been
applied in the absence of de novo review, the parties or court would likely
have taken the additional step to realize that de novo review would apply
under ORS 19.415(3).
One further explanation for at least part of the increase might be found
in a change in the nature of cases: in the post-2008 decisions, there were
thirty-two juvenile dependency cases listing the Oregon Department of
Health and Human Services (“DHS”) as a party and no such cases pre2008. These post-2008 DHS dependency cases, however, constituted
only about half of the total increase in cases referencing ORS 19.415, and
their exclusion from the analysis did not alter the outcome below.155
The results of this analysis demonstrate that the Court of Appeals’
prediction—that reversal rates would not change—appears to be correct.
This is not a surprise, given that the statutory change was made with the
intent of matching statutory language to the Court’s existing approach—
which already took into account the judges’ view of the relative
competencies of the courts regarding fact finding. The Court was
incorrect, however, in thinking that the amount of time spent on the issue
in the parties’ briefs would be reduced; in fact, because the Court now
asks parties to explain why they believe that de novo review is
appropriate, parties are effectively writing an entire new section in their

Court’s own discussion of the issues on appeal, heavily implicated facts that were discussed for the
first time in that argument or ruling.
154. There were thirty-six cases that cited ORS 19.415(3) in the pre-amendment period and
seventy-nine cases that referenced it in the post-amendment period.
155. Lora Keenan, a Staff Attorney with the Oregon Court of Appeals, suggested that the change
in case makeup was tied to additional funding received in 2009 by the Oregon Protective Services
Division to increase the department’s ability to litigate appeals in such cases. Notes of Telephone
Conversation between Jeffrey Dobbins and Lora Keenan (Nov. 18, 2014) (on file with author).
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opening briefs and spending a nearly identical amount of time on their
facts. There is no real improvement in the amount of time parties are
spending on facts in their briefs—including the time spent on the standard
of review—and it appears that the parties are spending more time now on
facts and the standard of review than was true before the change. The
length of the Court’s opinions also demonstrates that the Court—perhaps
because it has to spend time explaining why it is choosing a particular
standard or because there is more focus on the factual questions—also
has to spend more time on the facts of each case.
In the end, the absence of a real signal in the rate of reversal is not
particularly surprising. Given the intent of the statute, it might be
expected that the Court of Appeals would calibrate its post-amendment
rulings to maintain a rate of reversal similar to that prior to the
amendment. The point, however, is this: the reversal rate was governed
more by the Court of Appeals’ preexisting understandings about the
proper responsibilities of the trial court and the reviewing court in the
overall appellate system, than it was governed by the precise language of
the standard of review. The standard, in other words, does not matter as
much as what the standard represents about the relationship between the
Court of Appeals and the trial courts. Absent a more fundamental shift
in that relationship, one would not expect—and does not see—a change
in the rates of reversal.
B. Other Examples of Changing Standards of Review
Are there other circumstances when changes in a standard of review
have been imposed from the outside that might be used to test the
proposition that standards of review—in the absence of changes in the
reviewing court’s perception about the relationship between the relevant
decision makers—will not really lead to changes in the underlying
reversal rate? There are at least two examples that can initiate the
conversation and thought process about this issue, but a statistical
examination of these cases will be left for a later Article.
1. Review of Interpretations of Law by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 1987–1997, 2002–2012
Students and practitioners of administrative law are familiar with the
basic Chevron test,156 which governs the level of deference that federal

156. Arising, of course, out of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, 467 U.S.
837.
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courts give to certain agency interpretations of law.157 Courts examining
the validity of an agency’s interpretation of law engage in the so-called
“Chevron two-step” deference.158 Under this algorithm, courts first ask
whether Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue”
in the case.159 If Congress has done so, then the statute must be followed,
regardless of an agency’s contrary view.160 If the statute is not clear on
the relevant point, the second step calls on courts to defer to an agency’s
interpretation of law as long as it is a “reasonable” interpretation of the
underlying statutes.161
Commentators have spilled much ink on the interesting and
complicated subtleties associated with Chevron deference. Despite those
subtleties, however, Chevron rapidly became a highly cited United States
Supreme Court case. In the first fifteen years after the decision (from
1985 to 1999), the federal Courts of Appeals cited this Supreme Court
decision over 2,500 times.162 Whether because of its straightforward
algorithm for determining the appropriate deference to agency legal
decisions or for some other reason, Courts took to the Chevron algorithm
with vigor.
In 2000 and 2001, however, the Supreme Court added a twist to the
established Chevron algorithm. In Christensen v. Harris County, the
Supreme Court suggested that not all agency interpretations of law were
entitled to deference.163 In Christensen, the Court refused to give
deference to a letter opinion issued by the Department of Labor regarding
the proper interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, despite
ambiguity in the statute and an apparently reasonable interpretation
concluding that the informal nature of the letter did not justify Chevron
deference.164
Just a year later, in United States v. Mead Corporation, the Court
formalized the approach that it presaged in Christensen, adding a “step

157. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984); see
CHARLES H. KOCH & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 11:32 (4th ed.
2016) (discussing judicial review of administrative interpretations of law).
158. See Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350, 1353
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (applying “Chevron two-step” deference to a decision by the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration).
159. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
160. Id. at 842–43.
161. Id. at 843–44.
162. WestlawNext search for citations to Chevron in federal Courts of Appeal cases resulted in
2,534 results.
163. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
164. Id.
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zero” to the Chevron analysis.165 After Mead, reviewing courts are called
upon to examine whether an agency has been delegated the authority to
speak with the “force of law,” and whether the agency was exercising that
authority in making the decision on review.166 If it is not speaking with
the “force of law,” an agency’s decision is entitled only to Skidmore v.
Swift & Company deference—under which courts defer to the persuasive
value of an agency’s determination, but they do not feel themselves
bound by it.167
While the Court majority in Mead described the decision as an
unremarkable gloss on long-accepted principles associated with
Chevron,168 the dissent’s view strongly suggested that the majority
opinion marked a sea change in the standard of review for important
(though not “speaking with the force of law”) agency decisions.169
Subsequent cases bear out the dissent’s belief that the decisions in
Christensen and Mead marked a significant change in the Supreme
Court’s Chevron doctrine, and demonstrate a marked decrease in the
Court's reliance on Chevron deference.170
Before Christensen and Mead, courts enthusiastically applied Chevron
deference to agency legal interpretations (almost) regardless of the
source.171 After the decisions, courts were called upon to evaluate
whether a particular decision was within the scope of statements carrying
the “force of law” as delegated to it by Congress.
While the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mead and Christensen did not
165. See 533 U.S. 218, 237–38 (2001) (holding that United States Custom’s ruling letters were
not entitled to Chevron deference because Congress did not intend these letters to have the “force
of law”).
166. Id.
167. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
168. Mead, 533 U.S. at 237.
169. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. See Linda Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 781 (2007) (noting how “Chevron’s stronghold appears to be weakening”).
171. Not all federal courts did so; the federal circuit’s refusal to defer to the Customs Service’s
tariff rulings was the source of a circuit split that was subsequently resolved by Mead. As the
United States Solicitor General noted in the petition for certiorari in Mead, most federal courts of
appeals at that time held that “agency interpretations adopted by means other than formal
regulations are entitled to judicial deference.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7–18, Mead, 533
U.S. 218 (No. 99-1434) (citing, e.g., Ass’n of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246,
1251–52 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); Gould v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 714, 719–20, 720 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994); Georgia
Dep’t of Med. Assistance v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1565, 1571 n.8 (11th Cir. 1993); Coca Cola Co. v.
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry., 608 F.2d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1979); also citing Elizabeth
Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181-182 (3d Cir. 1995) (according
deference to agency policy statement), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093 (1996); Emerson v. Steffen, 959
F.2d 119, 122 (8th Cir. 1992) (same)).
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purport to be anything other than a slight modification of the Chevron
approach, the opinions certainly altered the approach with which the
lower courts had become familiar. With few exceptions, most lower
courts had not previously distinguished between the deference to be
applied to agency statements that did not “speak with the force of law,”
and statements that did so; the distinction simply was not part of the
analysis. Once the Supreme Court introduced “step zero,”172 however,
courts were called upon to examine whether an agency’s decision spoke
with “the force of law,” and if not, Skidmore deference, rather than
Chevron, would be applied.173
An examination into the rates of reversal in decisions reviewing
agency actions speaking without the “force of law” should reveal the
degree to which this change in the standard of review for agency
decisions in this category altered the rates of reversal in the United States
Courts of Appeal.
The analysis would require examining United States Courts of Appeal
opinions from the pre-Christensen period to identify circumstances in
which agency statements of law are articulated in “subzero” cases (i.e.,
cases where the analysis would not move beyond “step zero” under the
law as stated after the 2002 Mead decision.174 To avoid possible
confounding effects that the petition (and certainly its grant) might have
on the decisions of the relevant Circuit Court of Appeals, the analysis
would have to focus on a United States Court of Appeals that adhered to
a “pure” Chevron analysis for all agency decisions in the period predating
the filing of the petition for certiorari in Christensen.175 The preChristensen reversal rate could then be compared against the post-Mead
reversal rate in those same appellate courts over a similar time period.176
172. This is the shorthand used by commentators and courts to refer to the step introduced by
Christensen and Mead. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190–92
(2006).
173. Id. at 211–12; see also Prime Time Int’l Co. v. Vilsack, 930 F. Supp. 2d 240, 248 (D.D.C.
2013), aff’d sub nom. Prime Time Int’l Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 753 F.3d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(“The threshold inquiry—sometimes called Chevron ‘step zero’—is determining whether Congress
has delegated interpretive authority to the agency in question.”).
174. It might also be informative, though certainly more work, to categorize all relevant cases
decided using Chevron’s algorithm, even if they would not fit into the “subzero” categories.
175. The Fifth Circuit decision that was under review in Christensen was issued in October,
1998; so, an ideal span of decisions for review would involve decisions issued between July 1, 1996
and July 1, 1998. Determining the best circuits for this purpose will take additional investigation
into how they approached this question in the years preceding Christensen; the Federal Circuit is
the Court of Appeals that issued the (non-deferential) decision that later came under review in
Mead, so that court is not a candidate for the study.
176. To match the period from before Christensen, I would use July 1, 2003 (to allow news of
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Again, although this would not eliminate all confounding factors as
judges and cases change, presumably the makeup of the relevant court
and its case load would be similar in the two time periods, which might
eliminate some confounding factors that could otherwise influence
reversal rates from very different cases or courts.
2. Review of Downward Departures Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 1991–1997
A second change that might merit future investigation is the level of
discretion that federal courts use to review decisions by lower courts that
depart from baseline sentences calculated under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Although subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions
in Blakely v. Washington177 and United States v. Booker178 have since
undermined the binding nature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the
period between their initial promulgation and the “beginning of the end”
of their mandatory application in federal court is one in which the
standard of review changed on several occasions. For purposes of this
analysis, this Part of the Article focuses on the shift occasioned by the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Koon v. United States, which
effectively eased judicial review of departures in most circuits.179
At their heart, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines established an
algorithm for determining the appropriate sentence for a particular
defendant based on the nature and circumstances of his offense and a
variety of other factors.180 In rare cases, district court judges were given
the ability to “depart” from the sentence mandated by the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.181 District courts only rarely exercised this
authority, but when they did, appellate courts were tasked with reviewing
the appropriateness of that departure. Until the decision in Koon, the
federal appellate courts generally reviewed the validity of departures via
a staged approach under which any facts justifying the departure were
examined using a “clear error” standard, while the decision whether to
Mead to “sink in” to the minds of practitioners and judges) through July 1, 2006.
177. 542 U.S. 296, 304–05 (2004) (holding that Washington State’s sentencing statute violated
the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee).
178. 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (holding that, except for prior convictions, all facts used to apply
federal sentencing guidelines must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
179. 518 U.S. 81 (1996); Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 94, at 412 (referring to United
States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942 (1993)).
180. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (citing baseline sentencing principles, including particular
characteristics of the offense and the defendant).
181. See id. § 3553 (noting instances where judges may use discretion within the mandated
Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
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depart was reviewed de novo, and the magnitude of the departure was
reviewed for abuse of discretion.182 Although the First Circuit was the
first to adopt this tiered approach to departure decisions, it was also the
first to abandon it, thereby setting up a circuit split that led to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Koon.183
In the 1996 decision in Koon, the United States Supreme Court adopted
a reasonableness standard for the entire departure decision—calling on
the United States Courts of Appeal to apply an “abuse of discretion” test
to determine whether departures were valid.184
Some work has already been conducted into the effect of this change
(as well as subsequent changes) on the rate of reversal in the United States
Courts of Appeal. For example, in 2002, Paul Verkuil’s study briefly
examined sentencing decisions, but he did so only for the post-Koon era
in an effort to evaluate the reversal rate under the deferential “abuse of
discretion” standard.185 He concluded that the reversal rate was
approximately 20 percent, but did not compare that rate to the pre-Koon
era during which the tiered review process applied de novo review to the
decision to depart,186 so it provides little information about whether the
change in the standard of review resulted in a shift in outcomes. Some
authors predicted that it would not.187
As noted above, Fischman and Schanzenbach concluded in 2011 that
district court judges were affected by the change in the standard of review
for departures under the guidelines, and they assumed that this meant that
appellate courts were also treating cases differently.188 But this
conclusion was not directly measured; it was simply presumed from the
182. United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 951–52 (1st Cir. 1993); Fischman & Schanzenbach,
supra note 94, at 412.
183. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 51–52 (1st Cir. 1989).
184. Koon, 518 U.S. at 98–100. This standard was subsequently changed by statute, and again
by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which effectively
removed all mandatory features of the federal sentencing guidelines to guarantee compliance with
the Sixth Amendment. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
185. Verkuil, supra note 16, at 720–22.
186. Id.
187. See Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 94, at 406 (noting the scholars that doubt that
“changing from a de novo to an abuse of discretion standards would have much impact”). To prove
their point, their article cites generally to Cynthia K. Y. Lee, A New “Sliding Scale of Difference”
Approach to Abuse of Discretion: Appellate Review of District Court Departures under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1997) and KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES,
FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998). Id.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 94–99 (describing the 2011 study by Fischmann and
Schanzenbach).
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fact that district court decisions were changing.189 A more careful study
of appellate cases under other circumstances of changed standards of
review should provide other opportunities to fully evaluate the effect of
the standard of review on the work of appellate courts.
III. LESSONS FROM CHANGE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
Standards of review are, at their heart, statements about the proper
relationship between structural components of the appellate process.
Discussions about the appropriate standard of review are one of the few
places that our appellate system implicitly (if not explicitly) discusses this
relationship. If one compares the discussion about standards of review,
for instance, to the general lack of discussion in appellate cases about the
bindingness of precedent,190 a standard of review discussion includes
much more analysis into the roles of appellate courts, trial courts, and
agencies, as well as into the relative competence of those entities in
various parts of the legal process.
This Article suggests, then, that the value of discussions about
standards of review comes not so much from a direct effect of the
standard on the outcome in a particular case, but from the rhetorical effect
that the standard—and the implications for appellate structure that are
embodied within it—has on how the reviewing courts (as well as the
advocates, lower courts, and agencies) perceive their role. While there
does appear to be a net effect from the application of a particular standard
in a particular case, this Article suggests that this results not so much from
applying a particular standard to a particular case, but rather to the way
in which standards of review affect (and reflect) the way that courts,
agencies, and advocates think about their place in the system of legal
review.
This perspective may seem rather theoretical, and arguably irrelevant:
If standards of review matter—and they do, at least rhetorically—then
why does it matter how they matter? An appellate court might reverse a
trial court’s evidentiary ruling by explicitly concluding that it amounted
to an abuse of discretion. Alternatively, it might reverse because it calls
something an abuse of discretion because it believes that, given its role
in the legal system under the circumstances of that particular case, it has
the ability to place more weight on its understanding of the proper ruling,
rather than the trial court’s decision that was made on-the-fly at trial.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 94–98 (noting that the 2011 study by Fischmann and
Schanzenbach was based on a perception). Again, a direct examination into the data surrounding
this change awaits further development.
190. See generally Dobbins, Structure, supra note 11 (recognizing the difficulty in ascertaining
the precedential and binding effect when changes occur within federal appellate review).
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Does the difference in the underlying rationale matter?
It appears, however, that the implications for appellate practice and
how one thinks about standards of review are tangible and twofold. First,
when legislative entities (or rules committees or courts) define standards
of review for a particular question, they should recognize that the value
of the standard does not come primarily from the definition itself. The
precise phrasing of the standard might not make a critical difference to
the outcome of a particular case. What is more important is the
surrounding discussion (or understanding) regarding the relative role that
the reviewing court has vis-à-vis the work of the trial court or the
administrative agency. For that reason, those defining the scope of a
standard of review should make an effort to incorporate into their
discussion (or the legislative or administrative history) an explanation for
why it is that the relative authority of the reviewing court should have the
relationship to the decision-making body that it does. Whenever
standards of review change (or are initially established), this
consideration should accompany the development and articulation of that
standard.
Second, it suggests that counsel should not be sanguine about
standards of review, even in cases where existing law appears to clearly
define the relevant standard. As the uncertain data regarding the effect
of standards on reversal rates suggests, appellate courts that rely on
settled standards of review still have a very broad decision space within
which they can apply that standard—a decision space which may well
encompass both affirmance and reversal. The responsibility (and
opportunity) for counsel in these cases is to communicate, in some way,
the underlying rationale and structural justification for the relevant
standard in a way that helps to direct the appellate court to an
understanding of not so much the standard itself, but the way in which
the appellate court thinks about its relative competence compared to that
of the decision maker under review.
To come full circle, then, this Article suggests that standards of review
do matter—but not how one might think. Rather than directing a
particular outcome in a particular case, the power of the standard of
review comes from the rhetorical signal that they send about the
relationship and relative competence of the players in the larger legal
system. The most useful application of that standard comes from what it
suggests about the relative authority of the reviewing court when
compared to the deciding court. With that understanding, legislative
bodies, courts, and counsel could refocus their attention on standards of
review or change them in a manner that fully reflects their underlying
purpose. Further examination into other circumstances in which
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standards of review have changed at the instigation of judicial decisions
(like those in Koon and Mead) should shed further light on the lessons
that can be drawn from changing standards of review.
TABLE 1191

Pre-Amendment
(all de novo
review)
Post-Amendment
(discretionary de
novo review)

Outcome on
Questions of Fact

Length
of Case
Facts

Affirmed

Reversed

(words)

71%

29%

1052

75%

25%

1438

“Any
Evidence”
N=66

78%

22%

De Novo*
N=13

61%

28%

N=36

Overall
N=79

*Of the post-amendment de novo review cases, six (6) were termination
of parental rights cases, in which de novo review is still mandated, all of
those were affirmed.

191. There is no significant difference in reversal rates overall, between pre-amendment and
post-amendment using “any evidence,” and between pre-amendment and post-amendment using
“de novo.” There is a significant difference (p < .05) in the length of the fact discussion with the
length greater in post-amendment decisions.

